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In 2016, two independent teams, one in the United States and one in the United Kingdom, reported culturing human embryos in vitro up 
to fourteen days after fertilization.1 The experiments 
were terminated by day fourteen or at the formation 
of the primitive streak to respect an international 
norm and, in the case of the U.K. team, to be in 
compliance with the law. This norm is known as the 
fourteen-day rule or fourteen-day limit.
The fourteen-day limit for embryo research was 
proposed first in a 1979 U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (DHEW) report and later 
in the 1984 U.K. Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, common-
ly known as the Warnock Report.2 The preparation 
of both documents involved extensive public and 
stakeholder engagement, including in-person meet-
ings and the review of hundreds of letters from the 
public. The reports focused on the clinical practice 
of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and its related research.
Fourteen days was not chosen arbitrarily. Rather, 
specific reasons were offered for adopting it with-
in these reports, and additional justifications were 
articulated in the three decades following their re-
lease.3 First, the primitive streak appears around 
fourteen days, marking the first visible sign of signif-
icant organization of the embryo just prior to neural 
tube formation, and it is an event that can be easily 
New technology makes it feasible to culture human embryos several days longer than before, 
beyond the fourteen-day limit on such research. A deliberative process with broad stakeholder participation 
and public outreach is essential in reassessing that carefully established limit. 
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identified in culture. Furthermore, 
twinning does not seem to occur after 
fourteen days,4 suggesting that this is 
the point of individuation, leading 
some to claim that destruction of 
embryos prior to this point does not 
destroy individuals.5
The diverse international regula-
tions on human embryo research 
adopted since the limit was proposed 
reflect different normative views. 
Some countries (including Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey) 
ban human embryo research.6 The 
United Kingdom includes the 
fourteen-day limit in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 
1990, which permits human embryo 
research after approval by a regulatory 
authority. Other countries (including 
Canada, South Korea, and Sweden) 
allow certain human embryo research 
but have enshrined the fourteen-day 
limit into law. Still other countries 
(Israel among them) regulate human 
embryo research but do not specify a 
particular limit. In the United States, 
researchers cannot use federal funds 
for human embryo research, but pri-
vately funded research beyond four-
teen days is possible. Nevertheless, to 
date, scientists appear to respect the 
fourteen-day limit, regardless of its 
legal status in their country.
The fourteen-day limit is often 
framed as an ethical compromise to 
permit human embryo research de-
spite the moral objections of some. 
However, when the limit was estab-
lished, it was not technically possible 
to culture human embryos beyond 
five or six days. Thus, the fourteen-
day limit imposed no tangible restric-
tion to human embryo research, and 
proponents of this research lost little 
in agreeing to it. A policy that pro-
hibits what is not scientifically fea-
sible does not impinge on practice. 
In contrast, those who opposed all 
human embryo research relinquished 
their preference for a complete prohi-
bition. Only now that technology has 
advanced does the fourteen-day limit 
appear to reflect a compromise be-
tween some human embryo research 
proponents and opponents.
Arguments for and against 
Changing the Fourteen-Day 
Limit
Following the 2016 publications describing the technological fea-
sibility of culturing human embryos 
beyond the fourteen-day limit, sci-
entists and others began discuss-
ing its relevance.7 Those pushing to 
abandon the limit see it as a technical 
constraint, rejecting the view that re-
search beyond this point is unethical.8 
Most arguments for moving the limit 
highlight the knowledge obtainable 
beyond day fourteen. After all, there 
is, in fact, limited knowledge of early 
human development, with theories 
about embryo development based in 
large part on animal studies and fixed 
slides of embryos. Arguments in favor 
of moving the limit further contend 
that research beyond day fourteen 
could help improve IVF results and 
expand understanding of the effect 
of toxic chemicals and environmental 
factors on embryos, the causes of in-
fertility, and early developmental is-
sues such as neural tube closure.9
In addition, some parties have 
argued that the fourteen-day limit 
is now obsolete because it is unclear 
whether and how it applies to human 
embryoid research. Embryoids are 
derived from pluripotent stem cells 
and seem to mimic early human de-
velopment—that is, they recapitulate, 
in vitro, salient aspects of the early 
stages of embryo development—al-
though they are not embryos.10 Some 
see them as alternatives to using hu-
man embryos in research.11 However, 
embryoids do not progress linearly; 
instead, they mimic specific devel-
opmental points. For example, an 
embryoid could mimic gastrulation 
(around day seventeen in actual hu-
man embryos) in less than fourteen 
days but without having developed 
the primitive streak. Furthermore, 
embryoids approximate only the 
early embryo; they cannot become 
fully functional human embryos. 
Therefore, many scientists suggest 
that research on embryoids should 
not be guided by the fourteen-day 
limit nor regulated as human embryo 
research. As a related matter, it is un-
clear whether many national human 
embryo research laws and guidelines 
pertain to embryoid research.12
At the same time, others offer rea-
sons to maintain the fourteen-day 
limit, at least for now. Those who 
object to all research that destroys 
human embryos would likely not 
support any expansion of research. 
For those who accept some human 
embryo research but have moral reser-
vations about certain forms of it, the 
limit serves as an ethical limit. Indeed, 
on such grounds, Mary Warnock, 
Magdalena Zernicka-Goetz (the 
leader of the United Kingdom-based 
lab that cultured human embryos up 
to day fourteen in 2016), and others 
opine that it should not be changed 
without more rigorous discussion and 
debate.13 Others argue that the four-
teen-day limit was a compromise and 
should stay in place despite new tech-
nical possibilities and research oppor-
tunities. In their view, abandoning 
the limit, now that it is only policy 
and not technology standing in the 
way of research, would suggest that 
scientists cannot be trusted to respect 
policies developed through compro-
mise and could undermine public 
trust in science. It has also been sug-
gested that valuable research could 
be conducted prior to day fourteen 
to help in understanding early preg-
nancy loss, improve IVF, and inves-
tigate environmental factors on the 
embryos. Since research on embryos 
approaching fourteen days has only 
recently become possible, much can 
still be learned from additional work 
prior to day fourteen without chang-
ing or abandoning the limit. Further, 
the results of such research could in-
form future public and stakeholder 
engagement on the question whether 
research beyond fourteen days should 
be permitted.
Challenges with Developing 
New Policies
Among those calling to change the fourteen-day limit, there is no 
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agreement about what, if anything, 
should replace it or what would jus-
tify adopting different limits or cri-
teria for research on older embryos. 
Based on this lack of consensus and 
the global diversity of current hu-
man embryo and embryonic stem 
cell research policies, it is reasonable 
to expect that various policies will be 
developed to fit the values and prefer-
ences of different jurisdictions. While 
understandable, this diverse set of 
policies might complicate scientific 
work and limit scientists’ ability to 
collaborate, present, and publish in-
ternationally.
There are several possible options 
for replacing the fourteen-day limit. 
One possibility is to identify a new 
date, such as twenty-eight days, or a 
biological event, such as neural tube 
closure, which begins around seven-
teen days. If a biological event is used, 
it must be easily identifiable so that 
researchers can observe it without 
perturbing their experiments and do 
not accidently exceed the limit. The 
fourteen-day limit meets this crite-
rion for embryos (but not embry-
oids) because it is linked to the visible 
formation of the primitive streak, al-
lowing multiple noninvasive checks 
to ensure adherence.14 In fact, some 
national laws use the date, some use 
the biological event, and others use 
both. However, there is no consensus 
on what a new time point or event 
should be.
Another option is to have no es-
tablished limit but to review human 
embryo research intended to exceed 
fourteen days on a case-by-case basis. 
Using this approach, each proposed 
research project would be evaluated 
in light of a set of criteria, similar to 
how research ethics committees such 
as institutional review boards oversee 
human research or how stem cell re-
search oversight (SCRO) committees 
review research involving some types 
of human pluripotent stem cells. 
The review process would require 
investigators to articulate why the ex-
pected knowledge justifies culturing 
embryos beyond fourteen days. This 
option would, however, necessitate 
creating explicit guidelines, establish-
ing oversight bodies with sufficient 
expertise and authority, and imple-
menting transparent procedures to 
promote public confidence in the 
decisions rendered. Although such a 
system might be subject to many of 
the criticisms of contemporary hu-
man research oversight processes, in-
cluding variability in decisions made 
by different review boards, a formal 
oversight process that has clearly de-
fined procedures is, as we argue be-
low, important for human embryo 
research.15
The Need for Transparency and 
Stakeholder Engagement
The robustness and longevity of the fourteen-day limit may owe 
much to the deliberative and trans-
parent process used to develop it. 
Accordingly, both public and stake-
holder engagement seems critical 
to determining what, if any, policy 
changes are appropriate.
Given the widespread acceptance 
of the fourteen-day limit, contested 
value judgments about embryos, the 
concerns about extending the limit, 
and the uncertain benefits from ex-
tending it,16 a deliberative process 
that entails broad stakeholder par-
ticipation and public outreach is 
needed for determining whether a 
new embryo research limit should be 
implemented and, if so, which one. 
The range of stakeholders to be en-
gaged includes patients, embryo do-
nors, scientists, clinicians, funders, 
and religious leaders. Engagement 
should ideally help to identify trust-
worthy solutions that limit offense to 
those who object to human embryo 
research. Failing to engage relevant 
stakeholders risks missing important 
perspectives on this complex issue 
and the loss of public trust in sci-
ence. In contrast, public dialogue, 
though requiring significant time and 
resources to be done well, seems well 
suited to help advance science as a 
good worthy of public support.
It is worth recalling that, when de-
veloping the 1979 DHEW report, the 
committee conducted eleven hearings 
in nine cities across the United States 
and reviewed more than two thou-
sand documents received from the 
public.17 Similarly, the U.K. process 
to develop the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority involved 
both the Warnock commission and 
its report (including minority dis-
sents) as well as six years of public dis-
cussion before the law was passed.18 
More recently, HFEA conducted a 
multiyear consultation process to de-
velop guidelines for mitochondrial 
replacement therapy, including re-
viewing scientific and ethical issues 
as well as conducting open public 
dialogues.19 Engaging diverse pub-
lics to identify and understand broad 
concerns linked with more focused 
engagement with stakeholders can 
help develop a policy with appropri-
ate justifications.
Oversight of Human Embryo 
and Embryoid Research
Despite the ethical issues asso-ciated with embryo research, 
Scientists should work with stakeholders to develop 
processes for rigorous and transparent oversight of 
all human embryo research.
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there has long been recognition that 
independent oversight is lacking in 
some jurisdictions. Whether or not 
the fourteen-day limit is maintained, 
a system for reviewing and oversee-
ing human embryo research in all 
jurisdictions where the research is 
permitted would be desirable. This is 
particularly vital in the United States, 
where there is no centralized author-
ity over human embryo research 
(with the exclusion of research in-
tended for clinical therapies that the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
reviews). Other than that, no federal 
requirement for local or institutional 
oversight of human embryo research 
exists. However, the United States is 
not unique; other countries, includ-
ing China and India, also do not have 
national authorities overseeing hu-
man embryo research.20
Appropriate oversight could be 
established by law, as is the case in 
the United Kingdom, or through 
professional standards. In the United 
Kingdom, the HFEA specifies how to 
obtain licenses, lists all research under 
licensure, and holds public consulta-
tions when considering any changes 
in its mandate. It uses transparent 
oversight processes that ensure ap-
propriate review and enforcement of 
limits.21
In contrast, the International 
Society for Stem Cell Research issues 
guidelines that provide recommen-
dations for human embryo research 
oversight that could be undertaken 
through institutional and profes-
sional channels. ISSCR suggests that 
existing institutional SCRO commit-
tees are one means of meeting these 
recommendations.22 Adding human 
embryo research oversight to the re-
sponsibilities of SCRO committees 
or convening a similar committee 
for this purpose acknowledges the 
sensitive nature of human embryo 
research and ensures it is vetted sci-
entifically and ethically. It would also 
provide independent ethical oversight 
that this research might not have oth-
erwise.
Oversight responsibility could be 
added to existing committees, or new 
ones could be formed to review hu-
man embryo and embryoid research. 
Regardless of the means, it will be 
important to specify requirements for 
the composition of such committees 
and the criteria used for reviewing 
research, akin to the existing require-
ments for institutional review boards 
(and, outside the United States, re-
search ethics committees). Human 
embryo oversight committees should 
also be subject to some form of ex-
ternal review or accreditation to help 
ensure a consistent and competent 
process for research oversight.
Moving Forward
Arguments for changing the fourteen-day limit have emerged 
following the development of novel 
technical innovations and a scientific 
desire to further understand early 
human development. However, al-
though the technological possibility 
of doing so and the promise of new 
knowledge are necessary conditions 
for considering a change to the four-
teen-day limit, they alone seem to 
be insufficient. Deliberations about 
changing the limit should also take 
into account the ethical arguments for 
and against human embryo research, 
particularly regarding research on 
more developed embryos. Scientists 
should not conduct these discus-
sions in isolation. The fourteen-day 
limit was adopted after extensive and 
transparent public and stakeholder 
engagement in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Any possible 
change would benefit from a compa-
rable process.23
Scientists should also work with 
interested stakeholders to develop 
processes for rigorous and transpar-
ent oversight of all human embryo 
research—even research on embryos 
prior to fourteen days, which is cur-
rently subject to little or no oversight 
in some jurisdictions. Such oversight 
could enhance public trust in the sci-
entific process and ensure account-
ability. Oversight guidelines should 
include criteria for the composition 
and function of oversight committees 
and for the review and approval of 
human embryo research. Oversight 
committees should also have ad-
equate stakeholder representation. 
Proper oversight acknowledges the 
sensitive nature of human embryo 
research, promotes transparency and 
high-quality science, and can ulti-
mately contribute to and enhance 
public trust in science.
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